ORDER, 11/15/00

ABORTION INDUSTRY IN MELBOURNE, FLORIDA
LAWSUITS
RANEY V MELBOURNE
DOCKET / CHRONOLOGICAL FILE
ORDER, 11/15/00

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-11403
Non-Argument Calender

D.C. Docket No. 99-00416-6:99CV-ORL-19B

MEREDITH T. RANEY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF MELBOURNE, FLORIDA,
Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
(November 15, 2000)

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Meredith T. Raney, Jr. appeals the district court's order dismissing his claims brought under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S,C. § 248 (the "FACE Act") against the City of Melbourne, Florida (the "City"). We affirm.

Between June 30, 1994 and June 8, 1996, Raney, an admitted anti-abortion activist, attempted to offer pro-life counseling and referral services to women on the sidewalk outside the Aware Women Center for Choice, Inc. (the "Clinic"). Raney alleges that police regularly threatened him with arrest for engaging in such activities and actually arrested him three times for violating a judicial injunction that prohibited anti-abortion protestors from entering a specified thirty-six foot buffer zone around the Clinic. Raney sued the City for violating the FACE Act[1] by allegedly interfering with, threatening, and physically prevented him from providing "reproductive health services" to men and women when they were entering or leaving the clinic.

Raney raises several issues on appeal. First, Raney argues that the district court erred in determining that Raney lacked standing as a reproductive health provider to bring an action under the FACE Act. Second, Raney asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the City's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the motion to dismiss was allegedly based on defenses that were insufficient as a matter of law. Third, Raney argues that his case should be remanded to a different district judge because the district judge who decided the case was allegedly "prejudiced in favor of the abortion industry."

We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 225 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2000). In conducting such review, we keep in mind that a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id, (citation omitted).

The outcome of Raney's case is controlled by our decision in the recent ease, Raney v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, 224 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000). In Raney, we held that this same plaintiff could not bring a FACE Act action against the Clinic because a person providing reproductive counseling on the sidewalk outside a clinic may not claim that "he was in a facility [that provides reproductive health services] nor that he was offering the type of reproductive health services to which the FACT Act protects access." Id. at 1269. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Raney's FACE Act action for lack of standing and to deny Raney's motion to strike.[2]

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The FACE Act guarantees freedom of access to the entrances of reproductive health facilities. Raney v. Aware Woman Center for Choice, 224 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000).

[2] We perceive no merit in Raney's factually groundless assertion that the district court judge was biased in favor of the Clinic.